Since the end of the Cold War order post-Soviet borders have been characterised by geopolitical tensions and divergent imaginations of desirable political and spatial orders. Drawing upon ethnographic research in two border towns at the Russian-Estonian border, the article makes a case for a grounded examination of these border dynamics that takes into account how borders as sites of 'mobility and enclosure' are negotiated in everyday life and shaped by the differentiated incorporations of statecraft into people's lives. Depending on their historical memories, people interpret the border either as a barrier to previously free movement or as a security device and engage in correspondingly different relations to the state -privileging local concerns for mobility or adopting the state's concerns over security and sovereignty. Analysing these border negotiations and the relations between citizens and the state, articulated in people's expectations and claims, can provide us with a better understanding of how people participate in the making of borders and contribute to the stability and malleability of political orders.
Introduction
The towns of Narva and Ivangorod lie opposite each other on the Narova River, which marks the border between Estonia and Russia and the external border of the European Union. Despite being often defined as belonging to two opposing civilizational projects -the West and the East, Europe and Russia -symbolised by the architecture of their historic fortresses, throughout most of their history these two towns have been intimately connected. During the Soviet past, when the area was a major industrial 2 centre at the Soviet Union's western fringe, Narva and Ivangorod formed an integrated social and economic space: friendships and kin ties stretched from one town to the other; people went across the bridge to work in one of the large factories on the other side; they engaged in shared leisure activities like singing in a choir, sports activities and going to the cinema and buried their loved ones on a common cemetery. When Estonia declared its independence in 1991 and successively installed border guards and material fortifications along the border, the dense social and economic networks between the towns became more difficult to sustain, and the once integrated borderland turned into a site of divisions and nationalisation. 'Nas razrezali po-zhivomu', a Russian phrase meaning 'we were forced to break off our relations', or literally 'we were cut up alive' was used repeatedly by my informants to characterise the division of Narva and where, as this article shows, the border forms a site of particular tensions between security concerns on one hand and claims for greater border mobility and flows on the other.
Empirically, the article compares the narratives of two ethnic groups, Russianspeakers, who constituted the majority of the population on both sides of the RussianEstonian border, and a small group of ethnic Estonians living in Narva, Estonia. The
Russian-speakers had moved to the borderland during the Soviet period The article is structured as follows: firstly, I introduce the conceptual background of the study and the wider political context in which it is situated.
Subsequently, I present two narrative frames for engaging with the borderforegrounding mobility and cross-border spatialities on one hand, and sovereignty and security on the other -and discuss how the state becomes an object of different emotional engagements and claims-making in these two narratives. Finally, I draw some conclusions about the relations between states and citizens in processes of bordermaking and situate the results within the broader context of post-Soviet borders.
Borders between everyday life and the state
In a recent article on the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border, Madeleine Reeves argued for a differentiated analysis of borders and experiences of the 'state' in borderlands, pointing out that we should 'think about the "state" not just as a terrifying externality and its territorial "integrity" an abstraction ripe for deconstruction but also as the locus of intense emotional investment, as a site of enactment or performance, as the source of legitimation, and as an object of hope' (Reeves 2011, 918 ', 2008) . Despite some differences in their conceptual focus and degree of generalisation, these works share the concern for the vernacular with earlier approaches to the study of borders which focused on border 7 culture and identities through fieldwork research in particular local settings (for a discussion cf. Wilson 1999, Alvarez 1995 'method and theory sensitive to the historical exactness and density of human life' (Borneman 1998, 189) .
Remaking the Russian-Estonian Border
Over the past two and a half decades the Russian-Estonian border has been transformed 8 into an increasingly fortified and bureaucratic border regime. Between the border towns of Narva and Ivangorod the area of border control has been extended from a simple barrier to a large fenced zone equipped with modern surveillance technology, customs control and separate entries for cars and pedestrians. The border crossing has become more bureaucratic; the older and more easily manageable system of document controls through a propusk system (a system of local permits) was replaced by a far more cumbersome visa regime similar to the one other EU member states have with Russia. The situation in the country in relation to the border? I can clearly say that we see this all absolutely negatively. Earlier people went easily over the border -they came to us, we went to them. Now there are these obstacles. To visit your son you have to line up in these queues. Sons, children and grandchildren live there. Family ties (rodstvennye sviazi) were disrupted and you stand there in these crazy queues that nobody wants to solve. (Interview with Viktoriia, a pensioner living in Ivangorod, b. 1958 Ivangorod, b. , 16.12.2011 In most of the everyday talk, the border between Narva and Ivangorod was associated with crossings and travels that had become -due to the introduction of border controls and visa regimes as well as the long waiting lines at the border -increasingly difficult.
As the confines of the state scale were 'dissonant with borderlanders' other, and often more powerful, conceptions of spatial reality ' (van Schendel 2005, 377) and economic development (Pfoser 2014a) ; and also in the present these cross-border networks possessed a higher, more immediate relevance than the territory of the two states.
At the personal level there were however great differences in the intensities of experiencing the border as an obstacle. The differentiated permeability of borders has been noted as one of their key characteristics (Balibar 2002 ). Balibar illustrates this schematically, writing that For a rich person from a rich country… the border has become an embarkation formality, a point of symbolic acknowledgement of his social status, to be passed at a jog-trot. For a poor person from a poor country, however, the border tends to be something quite different: not only is it an obstacle which is very difficult to surmount, but it is a place he runs up against repeatedly, passing and repassing through it as and when he is expelled or allowed to join his family, so that it becomes, in the end, a place where he resides (Balibar 2002, 83 (for example, those who had relatives and graves to look after on the other side).
According to the citizenship legislation adopted in independent Estonia, the Russianspeaking minority could not automatically obtain Estonian citizenship but had to undergo naturalisation first and pass a test on Estonian language and constitution. Over 40% of Narva's Russian-speaking inhabitants had therefore opted for a Russian passport or remained stateless. These differing citizenship statuses on the Estonian side of the border significantly structured people's mobility and created a complex set of bordercrossing abilities.
One person who experienced the border particularly intensely was Iuliia, a retired factory worker in her mid-fifties living in Ivangorod, who lived on her own in a 60s tower block and continued to live a cross-border family life. 'The Berlin wall did not disappear, it was moved here between Narva and Ivangorod' was the first thing she told me. It indicated how intensely the border mattered for her:
I was born in Narva, but because it was difficult under Soviet rule to receive a flat where you lived, I received one here [in Ivangorod]. We were working together. , b. 1956, 13.12.2011) Iuliia seemed angry and exhausted in the interview; she had planned to move together with her second husband but before they managed to get a flat from the municipality, (Interview with Natal'ia, b. 1954 Natal'ia, b. , 29.11.2011 These activities showed playful ways of dealing with the border and stressed the ability to manoeuvre and 'work' it to one's benefit. Like other respondents, Natal'ia however stated that smuggling and grey trade had become more difficult over time and the relative ease of working the border in the 'tumultuous 90s' (likhie devianostie) was gone (for an account of the changes, cf. Golunov 2013, 109-121) . Petty trade and smallscale contraband, mostly fuel, alcohol and cigarettes that people affixed to their bodies in the hope that they would not get body-checked by the guards, were the most common 15 forms of making use of the border. Observing activities around the border and listening to stories of smuggling, often involving a sense of joy about outwitting the state authorities, it was clear that many people continued to use cross-border trade as a source of income despite the increasing organisational work, time and risk involved in this activity. The border that in the 1990s had still appeared for some as a 'game' had become a physical reality; it was linked to a growing system of control that made it more difficult to use it. It was in this context of the hardening border regime that people articulated their concerns over mobility regulation and the role of the state.
Defending the Border: Sovereignty and Security in the Borderland
Borders Russia is such a huge thing (bolshaia makhina). I think that there you have even more of this disorder. (Interview with Sofia, b.1946 , 26.10.2011 Remembered the symbolic day when the last Russian troops left Estonia, Sofia put the establishment of the border -and the need to keep it closed -in the context of the Russian military presence in Estonia and connected it to a diffuse threat which persists until today. 4 While she saw rebordering of Estonia as a necessary measure against Russia's domination and negative influence on Estonia, she continued to perceive a threat coming from the other side of the border. Estonia's geopolitical location has prompted many comments and reflections among politicians and intellectuals, and with 140 million inhabitants in the Russian Federation in comparison to 1.3 million in Estonia and less than a million Estonian-speakers, Estonia's status as being 'small and therefore vulnerable' is a central motif in the discussion about national territorial sovereignty and about Estonia's integration into EU and NATO (Lauristin 1997) . Also
Sofia evoked images of a small state which was confronted with Russia's power and 'disorder' and used it to make an argument against those who want the border to be open. Russia's lack of democracy, grey trade ('dirty trade') and drug smuggling over the border were the central themes in the construction of Russia as an 'unpredictable' and 'scary' neighbour.
Studies have raised awareness about the role of security in Estonian society and have revealed the diffusion of the security discourse through which citizenship and culture have become objects of securitisation. Gregory Feldman, for example, has demonstrated how the Russian-speaking minority has been constructed as a cultural threat in Estonia (Feldman 2005) both by the national elite and by European actors.
Merje Kuus (2007 Kuus ( , 2004 has documented a general shift in the security rhetoric from military threat to cultural issues in Estonia and Eastern Europe. She writes that …security claims are increasingly based on more diffuse cultural categories, such as cultural spheres, frontiers, and homelands rather than on the territories of states.
Geopolitics is decoupled from state territoriality and transferred into the realms of cultural difference and moral values (Kuus 2007, 118) .
According to her, it is particularly the malleability of security discourse which has contributed to its continuing relevance in Eastern European states even after they joined the EU and NATO. This is certainly a valid argument and also Estonians in the borderland often used diffuse cultural qualities to characterise 'a Russian threat' to Estonians, sometimes moulding together Russia and Russian-speakers living locally in Estonia. At the same time, state territoriality remained of crucial importance to them.
In Of course, every people has the right of self-determination. This is how it was written in the Soviet constitution. If the Estonians want to live separately, of course, they should have the right to do so but the border should not violate the rights of the people who live alongside it. They need help to adapt to this life. Once the border appears you need to give them some benefits, you need to help them, so that they don't perceive the state in a negative way. (Interview with Iuliia, b. 1956 , 13.12.2011 Ultimately, it was not less state and the dissolution of the border that Iuliia desired but a state that cared and provided its citizens with benefits to counteract the disadvantages of life in a border town. Similar concerns were also raised by local business people like
Anton, who worked in Narva and was particularly worried about the local economic consequences of the border drawing.
When the economic crisis started, people lost their jobs and people started to go from Narva to Ivangorod to buy cigarettes. And to go to Ivangorod, there was the problem that you had to stand in a line for half a day to go there. The line of people grew. To solve the problem, they could have increased the salaries and created more working places so that people are not without work. No. They just decided to limit the amount of what you can take [across the border] and introduced more controls and punishments. That's how they solved it. The people don't live well?
You have to limit them, and they will adjust somehow. A state should love its people and not treat it in this way (Interview with Anton, b.1965 Anton, b. , 25.10.2011 Anton's story characterised cross-border trade as a way of coping with financial difficulties in the face of the economic crisis and risen prices. Limitations on the quantity and type of imported goods that can be brought from Ivangorod were 22 interpreted as a sign of the state's 'hatred'. Particularly in the face of the economic decline that the borderland had experienced in the course of the privatisation of the industries Anton claimed that it should not simply be the state that benefits from the border; borderlanders should also be able to take local advantage. Expressing their frustration and disappointments with the practices of border control, he and other people articulated inherited ideas of how a state should be, namely a state that does not restrict people, but instead provides support and care. Concerns about the right to mobility were thus not only articulated in the context of personal cross-border relations but also economically as a right to make use of the border. Smuggling and grey trade were described by many as a legitimate income and coping strategy in times of financial difficulties, framing them as albeit 'illegal' 'licit' (Abraham and van Schendel 2005, 4) . To evaluate these and other negotiations of borders and state authority, it is however important to take into account the specific socio-political context in which they are embedded. We have to consider Russian-speakers claims to mobility and Estonia and Ukraine -Estonia's membership in the EU and NATO provide international protection, and the higher living standards and social security arrangements make separatist movements a non attractive option for the Russianspeakers living in Estonian Narva, even for the ones who continue to feel a cultural affiliation to Russia. Their wish for mobility and a more fluid spatial order is primarily rooted in concerns to keep social ties up and a way to deal with a difficult economic situation. As internal borders within the EU show, mobility and feelings of security at borders do not necessarily contradict each other. It is an open question whether alternative border imaginaries that accommodate these two concerns can take hold at the Russian-Estonian border, so that mobility and cross-border ties are facilitated without leading to feelings of anxieties among Estonians. What seems certain though is that in the current political situation a desecuritisation of the border is highly unlikely.
